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FIRST DAY

FIRST SECTION
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXA.MINERS
Richmond, Virginia - December 11-12, 1972

1.
Transport Bus Company operated buses in Virginia on a
regular schedule over Uo s. Route 60. At 11~00 P.M. on June 20,
1972 one of its buses driven along that route by its employee
John Cole collided in Amherst County with the rear of a vehicle
parked without lights on the shoulder of the highway. Irma Seay,
who was asleep in the parked vehicle at the time of the collision,
sustained serious injur~es. Shortly thereafter, she brought an
action against Transport Bus Company in the Circuit Court of
Amherst County alleging that the collision was due to the negligence of Cole while acting in the scope of his employment, and
asking damages for $50,000. Cole was not named a party defendant
to the action. On the trial of the case counsel for Irma Seay
called Ernest Fox, a State Highway Patrolman, as a witness, and
established by his testimony that Fo-'c had arrived at the scene of
the collision about thirty minutes after it had occurred. Her
counsel then asked Fox whether he had talked with the bus driver
Cole at that time. After Fox replied that he had, counsel asked
Fox what statements were made to him by Cole respecting the col- '~
lision. To this counsel for Transport Bus Company objected on
the ground that any statements made by Cole to Fox were inadmissible as hearsay and could not be used against Transport Bus
Company. This objection was overruled, and Fox answered the
question by testifying that Cole had stated that he (Cole) was
dozing at the time of the collision, and believed he could have
avoided it had he been driving with care.
Did the Court err in overruling the objection
of counsel for Transport Bus Company, and in
permitting .Fox to so testify?
2.
Tom Jones and Al Smith were racing each other in their
automobiles down a street of the City of Richmond when they ran
through a stop light, and crashed into the side of an automobile
being driven by Harvey Stone. Although Stone was badly injured,
J~nes was injured even more severely and was taken to the hospital where he was placed under intensive careo Two days after
the collision had occurred, Alex Brown, an investig~ting police
officer, without permission walked into the hospital room of
Jones and asked Jones to tell him what happened to cause the
accident. Jones replied "My doctor has told me that I have ,.,...
Chance to live, and so I may as well tell you the trutho

(
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collision which injured Harvey Stone ·was partly my fault. Al
Smith and I raced through that red stop light and ran into the
side of Stone's automobileo" On the day after Jones made this
statement to Brown, Jones died as had been predicted. Stone
thereafter brought an action against Smith in the Law and Equity
Court of the City of Richmond to recover damages for his injuries.
At the trial, Stone called police officer Brown to the witness
stand and asked him to recite to the jury the statement made to
him by Jones while on his death bed. The defendant Smith objected to such testimony by Brown on the ground that it was hearsay, and that the deceased was not named as a party to the action.
The plaintiff Stone countered by contending the evidence was
admissible (a) on the ground that the statement made to Brown by
Jones was a dying declaration, and (b) on the further ground that
the statement made by Jones was a declaration against Jones' interest.
Should the court permit Brown to testify as to
the statement made by Jones on either, or both,
of these grounds?
3.
On October 15, 1972 Herbert Prentis was driving his
automobile in a westerly direction on Washington Street in the
City of Petersburg and Earl Wilson was driving his automobile in
a northerly direction on Sycamore Street in the same City. On
reaching the intersection of the two streets, Prentis' automobile
entered first and was one-half way across the intersection when
Wilson's vehicle coll~ded with the left side of Prentis' vehicle
severely injuring Prentis. Thereafter, Prentis brought an action
against Wilson in the Circuit Court of the City of Petersburg to
recover damages resulting from the collision. In his motion for
judgment, Prentis alleged his version of the facts of the case,
charged Wilson with negligence as the sole proximate cause of the
collision, and prayed for damages of $25,000 for personal injuries
and damage to his automobileo In his grounds of defense, Wilson
admitted that the collision occurred at the time and place alleged by Prentis, denied that he had been guilty of any negligence
which contributed to the collision, and averred that Prentis was
therefore not entitled to recover. During the trial, Prentis put
on evidence which supported his case, and rested. Counsel for
Wilson then called to the stand Sadie Ripley who testified that
she was standing on the northeast corner of Washington and Sycamore streets at the time of the collision, and had seen it occur.
Counsel for Wilson then asked Sadie:
"Q.

Did you see what Prentis was doing at the
time his automobile entered the intersection?
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"A.
11

Q.

I did.
What was he doing?

To this question, counsel for Prentis objected saying that any
answer Sadie might give to the question would be irrelevant and
without bearing on the question of negligence on the part of
Wilson. The court overruled the objection and ordered Sadie to
answer the question. She then said~
"A.

Prentis kept staring at me from the
time before he entered the intersection
until the time of the collision. He was
not looking where he was going."

Counsel for Prentis then moved the Court to strike from the record
Sadie's answer and instruct the jury to not consider it in reaching their verdict.
Should this motion by counsel for Prentis
have been granted?
4.
On November lp 1972, John Paul conunenced an action in
the Circuit Court of Henrico County against Torn Dunn to recover
$50,000 in damages for breach of contract. Paul's motion for
judgment, and its accompanying notice, were duly served on Dunn
on November 2nd. On November 15th, Dunn filed his grounds of
defense pleading to the merits of the action, and duly mailed a
copy thereof to Paul. On November 20th, Dunn filed in the action
and had served upon Paul, a demurrer, the body of which read in
its. entirety;
The·defendant says that the motion for
judgment is not sufficient in law. 11
11

Paul has now moved the court to strike out Dunn's demurrer on the
grounds (a) it is deficient in that" it does not recite why Paul's
motion for judgment is not sufficient in law, and (b) it came too
late in that it could not properly be filed after Dunn had pleaded
to the merits by his grounds of defense.
Should the Court sustain Paul's motion to
strike out the demurrer on either, or both,
of the grounds asserted?
So
Herbert Smith wrote and mailed the following letter to
~redericksburg Buick Corporation:

.: .. •·
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"April 17, 1972
"Fredericksburg 3uick Corporation
P. O. Bm: 1051
Fredericksburg, Virginia
Gentlemen~

I understand that Albert Bird has
agreed to buy from you a 1972 Revolta
model Buick automobile. My advice is
that you not make a sale to Bird. I
have had several business dealings with
him, and have found hir.1 to be a person
who cannot be trusted, and who always
tries to find a way to avoid paying his
debts.
Very truly yours,
(s) Herbert Smith"
Smith knew to be untrue the foregoing statement made concerning
Bird, and wrote the letter only because of a long standing animosity. Despite the letter, after considerable time and effort,
Bird succeeded in purchasing the automobile from Fredericksburg
Buick Corporation. On June 24, 1972 Bird, on being paid a consideration of $1,000 by Billy Steel, executed and delivered to
Steel an instrument by which he recited the assignment to Steel
of his cause of action against Smith for libel. on July 4th,
while attending festivities at the Fredericksburg Fairgrounds,
Bird died of a heart attack. Ste-el has now brought an action
against Smith on the ground of libel and, in his motion for judgment, has alleged all the foregoing facts, and asked for damages
of $5,000. Smith has demurred to the motion for judgment, and ,
as the grounds therefor has averred (a) the purported assignment
by Bird to Steel did not operate ta transfer Bird's cause of action to Steel, and (b) in any event, such cause of action terminated upon the death of Bird.
How should the Court rule on each ground of
the demurrer?

~: ~

t;ovember 10, 1972, Earl l!iller the proprietor of
Jewelry Store, ran up to Sam Strong, a police officer of
the City of Richmond, and said "Sam, I have just had a theft in
my store. The man who did it is Herbert Sands who lives across
the street from me. He came in, drew a pistol and said 'If you

~iller's
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don't unlock your show case I'll shoot you.' Being afraid, I
unlocked the show case and Sands took out of it four diamond
rings worth at least $2,000 and ran out of the store. I don't
know where he has gone, but I want you to arrest him." Strong,
who was familiar with Sands, at once went toward the latter's
home and, finding Sands on the street corner, Strong arrested
him and said "I am arresting you for the crime of grand larceny,
and I'm taking you to the police station." Strong then ~ced
n..;.~_hand into the coat pocket of Sands and withdrew from it four
diamond rings. Str~ook Sands to the poliae--station where he
was-ae~ained until his lawyer succeeded in having Sands released
on bail. On November 17th Sands was indicted by a grand jury of
the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond on the charge of grand
larceny. When the Court convened for trial on December 8th,
Sands' lawyer moved that the case be dismissed on the ground that
Sands could not be required to stand trial in that he had been
unlawfully arrested because no warrant had been issued for his
arrest either before or after he was taken into custody by Strong.
This motion was overruled by the Court. During the trial, the
Commonwealth sought to introduce in evidence the four diamond
rings which had been seized by Strong. Sands' lawyer objected to
the receipt of the rings·in evidence on the ground that they had
been taken from the person of Sands and that such taking was unlawful in that it had occurred without the prior issuance and
service of a search warrant. The Court overruled this objection
and admitted the rings'in evidence.
Did the Court err (a) 'in compelling Sands
to stand trial, and (b) in admitting the
rings in evidence? /va
7.
Arthur Thomas, a resident of Martinsville, Virginia,
brought an action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia against Bert Davis, a resident of
Reidsville, North Carolina, to recover $25,000 in damages resulting from a collision occurring in Martinsville between motor
Vehicles driven by Thomas and Davis. The complaint, which was
properly served on Davis, alleged liability on the ground that
Davis had negligently driven his automobile across the center
line of a street in Martinsville and collided headon with the
Vehicle being then driven by Thomas. At the same time he filed
his answer denying liability, Davis filed with the Court, pursuant to Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules, a third-party complaint
naming Herbert Frank, a resident of Martinsville, as a thirdparty defendant. By his third-party complaint, D~vis sought
recovery against Frank on the ground that Frank had carelessly
repaired the motor vehicle of Davis in such manner as to cause
Davis to lose control of the vehicle, thus causing it to collide
With the automobile driven by Thomas. Frank has now moved the

~··
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Court to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that the
Court has no jurisdiction over the third-party action brought
against him because he (Frank} and the original plaintiff Thomas
are both residents of Virginia.
How should the Court rule on the motion
of Frank?
Danny Boye, 19 years of age and a resident of Gate
City, Virginia, was the owner of a valuable farm located on the
outskirts of Kingsport, in Sullivan County, Tennessee, which had
been devised to him under the terms of the last will and testament of his deceased father.
On September 14, 1972, he received from Kingsport
Development Company a written offer to purchase the farm at the
price of $250,000. Danny Boye accepted the offer by letter,
delivered to the President of Kingsport Realty Company on September 15, 1972.
The law of Tennessee provides that a person must have
attained his twenty-first birthday in order to make a conveyance
of real estate, while the law of Virginia provides that one can
convey real estate after attaining his eighteenth birthday.
By the time Danny tendered a duly executed and acknowledged deed to the President of Kingsport Realty Company, the
latter had learned Danny's age. He now seeks your advice as to
whether he should accept the deed and pay the purchase price.
What should your advice be?
9.
Careless Corporation, in its bill of complaint filed
in the Circuit Court of Page county, Virginia, against High
Liver, alleged that he had embezzled money belonging to the corporation and had invested it in various properties owned by him
and described in the complaint. Careless sought an accounting
and prayed also that High Liver be enjoined from disposing of
the property which should be impressed with a trust for the
benefit of Careless. High Liver consulted you and convinced you
that he did not take any money belonging to Careless. He also
said that as he was a great believer in the jury system, he would
feel better about the matter if you could get him a trial by jury
whose verdict would be binding on the court.
What, if any, responsive pleading can you
file on his behalf in order to accomplish
this?
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10.
Plaintiff secured a judgment in the Circuit Court of
Hanover County against Defendant for $25,000 on November 15,
1972, for personal injuries received in an automobile accident.
Defendant wants to appeal the case to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
(a)
Within what period of time must Defendant
file with the Clerk of the trial court notice of appeal and assignments of error?
(b)
Within what period of time must the Plaintill file with the Clerk assignments of cross-error,
if any?
(c)
If the notice of appeal and assignments of
error state that no transcript or statement of facts,
testimony; or other incidents of the case will be filed,
for what period of time shall the Clerk hold the record
before sending it to the Clerk of the Supreme court of
Virginia?
·

FIRST DAY

SECTION TWO
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
Richmond, Virginia - December 11-12, 1972

1.
Andrews sold goods to Bell in good faith, believing
him to be a principal. Bell in fact was acting as agent of
Custer and within the scope of his authority. The goods were
charged to Bell, and on his refusal to pay, he was sued by
Andrews for the purchase price. While this action was pending,
Andrews learned of Bell's relationship with Custer. Nevertheless, 30 days after learning of that relationship, Andrews
secured judgment against Bell and had an execution issued which
was never satisfied. Three months after securing that judgment,
Andrews sued Custer for the purchase price of the ~oods.
Is Andrews entitled to collect from Custer?
2.
Bunker bought from Happy Homes, Inc. Lot 900 in '1Happy
Homes Estates" in Franklin County, Virginia, and Happy Homes, Inc.
agreed to construct a house on the lot. During the negotiations,
Bunker was given a plat showing that this lot fronted on a lake,
and he was advised that the lake front lots were more desiraple
and considerably more expensive than those not adjacent to the
lake. Actually, at the tine the contract was entered into, the
lake was nothing more than a swamp, but Happy Homes, Inc. assured
Bunker that Deep Water, Inc., owner of the swamp, would dredge
out the area and construct a lake. Among other things, the contract between Bunker and Happy Homes, Inc. provided:
"House to be built to be the Stylesetter
with all cinder block walls in basement to
be paneled •••• Lot is to be completely
finished including sodding, shrubbery, and
with a sand beach installed •••• It is further understood that the lake is to be
'cleaned out 1 up to Lot 900 by Deep Water,
Inc. Beach is to be 40 feet wide and not
to be installed until lake is lowered by
Deep Water, Inc.n
The house was built and possession was taken by Bunker
in the fall of 1971. In the spring of 1972, Bunker complained to
Happy Homes, Inc. that the lake had not been cleaned out, the sand
beach had not been installed and that the walls in the basement of
the house had not been paneled. Happy Homes, Inc. advised Buhk~r
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that Deep Water, Inc. would construct the lake and that thereafter Happy Homes, Inc. would install the beach and panel the
basement walls. When this had not been done by August 1972,
Bunker brought an action against Happy Homes, Inc. in the Circuit
Court of Franklin County for breach of contract and sought damages of $12,000. His motion for judgment alleged the foregoing
facts and to it was attached his contract.
Happy Homes, Inc. filed a demurrer to the motion for
judgment and relie<l upon the following grounds:
(a) It was the obligation of Deep Water, Inc. to
construct the lake, and there was no obligation of Happy Homes,
Inc. to see that such work was done; and
(b) The building of the beach was contingent upon
the construction of the laJ:e by Deep Water, Inc., and since Deep
Water, Inc. had not constructed the lake Happy Homes, Inc. was
not obligated to install the beach.
How ought the court rule on each ground of
the demurrer?
3.
Bill Adams and his wife entered into a contract with
Henry Brown whereby they agreed to sell him a designated one-:acre lot in Rockingham county, Virginia. At that time, Adams
and wife also owned two lots adjoining the one-acre lot. The
contract of sale contained the following provision:
"(7) The parties of the first part agree
that if they should sell the two lots adjoining this tract on the east, they shall
give the party of the second part first
choice."
The contract was duly recorded. Thereafter, a deed
of bargain and sale from Adams and"wife to Brown conveying the
one-acre lot purchased under the contract was duly recorded also.
Without giving any notice to Brown, Adams and wife one year later
conveyed the two adjoining lots to Henry Clark. After learning
of the conveyance to Clark, Brown instituted a chancery suit in
the Circuit Court of Rockingham County against Adams and wife
and Clark and wife asking the Court to enforce Provision (7)
quoted above by requiring Clark and wife to convey the two lots
to Brown. Brown alleged the foregoing facts in his bill of comPlaint and also alleged that he had always been ready, willing
and able to co~ply with the terms of the contract to purchase
the lots at the price at which they were conveyed to Clark and
that he had offered to purchase the lots from Clark at that p'ri_ce
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but that Clark had refused to sell. A copy of the contract from
which Provision (7) was quoted was attached to the bill of complaint. The defendants demurred to the bill of complaint on the
g.round that Provision (7) of the contract was too indefinite to
give rise to enforceable rights.
How should the Chancellor rule on the
demurrer?
4.
What estate, if any, is created i~ A (1) at conunon
law and (2) in Virginia today by the following language in a
deed conveying Blackacre with covenants of general warranty?
his body."

(a)

"To A for life with remainder to the heirs of

(b) "To D for life, then to C for life, then to B
for thirty years, then to A and his heirs," A, -B, C and D being
now living.
(c) "To B for life, provided that if he wishes to
do so, he may sell or otherwise dispose of the land herein conveyed, but. if any be left, then to A. 11
5.
Lewis leased a store building in Roanoke, Virginia,
to Thomas for a period of five years commencing June l, 1971.
Thomas covenanted to pay a monthly rental of $750. The lease
contained no other covenants nor were there any express undertakings by any party thereto. Thomas assigned the lease to
Andrews in January, 1972, and on June 1, 1972, Andrews subleased the premises to Baldwin. Baldwin became delinquent in
the payment of rent.
·
Lewis consults you as tQ his right to recover rent
for the period of Baldwin's delinquency from each of (A) Thomas,
(B) Andrews, and (C) Baldwin.
How ought you to advise him as to each of
the three parties?
6.
Mr. Rich had his secretary withdraw from.his safe
deposit box three negotiable notes which he had acquired from a·
third person. He then dictated a letter to each of his three
Children which said in part: "The enclosed note of $25,000 is
a gift for Christmas." Mr. Rich signed these letters after they
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had been typed, placed them along with the notes in separate
envelopes for each of his three children, and then he sealed the
envelopes. Each note was either payable to bearer or endorsed
in blank. He instructed his secretary to return the envelopes
to his safe deposit box. He indicated that he intended to mail
the envelopes to each of his three children. On later occasions
he advised each of his three children of what he had done and
that the notes were in envelopes in his safe deposit box. They
remained there until after his death on December 10th. When the
executors opened the box for inventory purposes, they found the
three sealed but unstamped envelopes among the contents of his
box. The executors delivered the envelopes to the respective
addresses of each of the three children. The executors brought
a chancery suit and alleged in the bill of complaint, among
other things, that the gifts in question were valid but their
validity had been questioned by certain heirs. They accordingly
prayed for the Court to determine whether decedent's acts were
sufficient to constitute valid gifts. Upon the trial of the
cause, the above facts were established by the evidence.
How ought the Chancellor to rule?
7.
On June 2, 1972, Fay Grieved brought an action against
Jonathan May, in the Circuit Court of Botetourt County, Virginia,
claiming damages in the amount of $50,000 for personal injuries,
alleged to have been sustained by her as a result of an automobile
accident, which had occurred in October, 1971, on Route 11 in said
County.
At the trial of the case, the plaintiff testified that
she was driving her automobile in a southerly direction and on her
own right hand side of the highway, when the automobile being ,
driven by the defendant, May, which was proceeding in a northerly
direction on the highway, crossed the centerline and crashed into
the left side of her automobile. The only other testimony in the
case respecting the cause of the c9llision was that of the def endant, May, who stated that he saw the plaintiff's automobile approaching from the opposite direction, but a few seconds before
the collision occurred, he had a sudden violent pain in his chest
and upper part of his left arm, which caused him to lose consciousness and resulted in his having lost control of his automobile.
He further testified that he had been taken to a Roanoke hospital
immediately following the accident, where, upon admission, he was
found to be suffering from a severe coronary attackp as well as
superficial cuts and abrasions which he had received in the accident. He further testified that he had never had a heart attack
or other serious illness prior to the date of the accident. This
testimony of May was corroborated by his attending physician •.

'·
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When both parties had rested their case, each moved the
court to enter summary judgment in his behalf.
What should be the ruling of the Court?
8.
On April 3, 1972, Thomas Young brought an action against
Dr. Alonzo Jones, a duly licensed physician of Christiansburg, Vir~
ginia, seeking damages for injuries which he claimed to have sustained as the result of the negligence of Dr. Jones in prescribing
certain medicine for the treatment of a throat infection of Young
which produced a severe allergic reaction in the area of his handso
The motion for judgment further alleged that this condition prevented him from engaging in his usual occupation for a period in
excess of nine months, causing a loss of earnings for that period,
and other damages.
At the trial of the case, Young testified that he had
had a similar allergic reaction to sulfa drugs previous to his
being treated by Dr. Jones; that Dr. Jones had-failed to ask him
if he was allergic to sulfa drugs before prescribing for his infected throat; and that after the allergic reaction to his hands
developed, Or. Jones had admitted he had prescribed sulfathiazole.
After introducing additional evidence as to the damages
incurred by him, he rested his case. The attorney for Dr. Janes
then moved the Court for a summary judgment on the following
grounds:
·
(a) That the plaintiff, Young, had failed to show any
negligence which would sustain a verdict against him as a practicing physician.
(b)

That in any event, such negligence cannot be shown

by the testimony of a layman or one unlearned in the medical P.ro-

fession.

Is either ground of Dr. "Jones' motion for
summary judgment well taken?
9.
Russell County Auto Sales, Inc., a dealer in new and
used automobiles of Lebanon, Virginia, became overstocked with
used automobiles and decided to hold an all-day auction sale in
order to dispose of as many of its used automobiles· as possible.
It advertised the sale to take place on Saturday, September 9, ·
1972, beginning at 9:00 a.m., at its place of business in Lebanon.
The advertisement stated that it had "a number of used automobiles
Which would be sold at auction, as is."
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':L'imothy Jc:.ckso;:i attended the sale and became the high
biU.der on a 1964 model 1 Fast Cat '1 at the price of ~525. The bill
of sale, executed in duplicate by Russell County Jmto Sales, Inc.
and Tir.1othy r recited the purchase price as having been paitl in
full an<.1 that the auton>.obile was sold r: as is. 1 ~ l;.fter Tir:1othy had
<lriven the car less than lC miles on his way hor:1e, the motor
started r.1aking an unusual noise anc1 finally stopped completely.
After ha.ving the autor.aobile towed to a repair shop, he was ad~
vised by a mechanic there that the engine block was badly cracked
and the entire notor would have to be replaced.
Timothy brings his copy of the bill of sale to you,
lates the foregoong facts and asks you to advise him as to his
remedies, if any, against Russell County lmto Gales, Inc.

re-~

i•7hat should you advise?

10. Holston Valley Television Sales Corporation is a retail merchant engaged in selling and servicing television sets in
the town of Narionr Virginia.

On July 7, 1972, Holston ordered 20 television s~ts
from True Picture TV Corporation, a wholesale dealer of Bristol.
The aggregate price for the 20 sets amounted to $5, 780. 'I'his sale
was made pursuant to a conditional sales contract duly executed
by both parties, '~ich recited that $1,000 of the aggregate price
had been paid by Holston and that ':'rue Picture would retain legal
title to all 20 sets until the balance of the purchase price had
been paid in full. In addition to the conditional sales agreement, the parties e~{ecuted and duly filed a proper financing statement. Thereafter, on Ausust 2, 1972, Holston sold to Sunshine
Inn ten color sets which were covered in its contract ·with 'I'rue
Picture, at the price of $500 each, and received the purchase
price in full. Thereafter, Holston became financie.lly irlirolver'.'. ~
and was unable to nake any payment on its obligation to ':l.1rue
.
Picture. Since the other 10 television sets were blacJc and white
models an<l had a total wholeaale value of only $970, True Picture
sought to enforce its security agreement in the Circuit Court of
Sr.lyth County against the 10 color sets which had been sold to
Sunshine Inn.
The manager of Sunshine Inn consults you and states
that, although he knew of the security agree~snt between Holston
and True Picture at the time of the ourchase of the 10 color sets
fror.1 Holston, :1e had been assured by~ the raanager of. Holston that
True Picture would be paid in full. He seeks your advice as to.
Whether True Picture can enforce against Sunshine Inn its security
agreeraent with Holston as to the 10 color sets which Sunshine Inn
· purchased from the latter.
~·nrnt

shoulC: you advise?

